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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY: WHEN AND WHY 
COLLECTIVE ENTITIES ARE LIKELY TO BE 
HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MISDEEDS 
OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS 
Steven J. Sherman* and Elise J. Percy** 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 5, 2010 a massive explosion rocked the Upper Big 
Branch coal mine in Raleigh County, West Virginia, killing 
twenty-nine mine workers and devastating a community.1 The 
incident was preceded by a large number of safety citations, 
demonstrating a pattern of violations by the mining company.2 
Later that same month, a thousand miles away in Dallas, Texas and 
under totally unrelated circumstances, seven-month old baby 
Brianna died after being forgotten all day in a locked car by a 
babysitter entrusted with her care.3 While these two tragic events 
proceeded completely independently of one another, they share 
some important similarities. In both cases, it could be said that 
innocent lives were lost because of the actions of parties 
                                                          
* Steven J. Sherman: Chancellor’s Professor of Psychological and Brain 
Sciences, Indiana University 
** Elise J. Percy: Doctoral Candidate, Department of Psychological and Brain 
Sciences, Indiana University 
1 David A. Fahrenthold & Kimberly Kindy, Safety Chief Details West 




3 Jon Nielsen, 7-month-old Forgotten in Car in Red Bird Dies, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 30, 2010, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/ 
dn/latestnews/stories/043010dnmetbabydead.d3e2577.html.  
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(babysitter and employer) that would traditionally be considered 
responsible for their safety,4 and in both cases, it would be difficult 
to convince anyone that the victims were themselves responsible 
for the outcomes—they were the unfortunate ones trapped to meet 
their mortal fate.  
Psychologists are interested in one particularly important 
difference between these two terrible events: in the former, the 
potentially responsible party is a corporate entity (Massey 
Energy5), while in the latter it is an individual entity (the unnamed 
babysitter6) who would ultimately be accused of wrongdoing. The 
notion that individuals are held responsible and are punished for 
their wrongdoings is understandable from both a legal and from a 
psychological perspective. The question of whether collective 
entities can, or should be, held responsible or punished for the acts 
of individual members of those entities is a much more complex 
and debatable issue. From a legal point of view, in many ways, 
collective entities such as corporations have been treated in the 
same way that individuals are treated. They can sue and be sued,7 
they have First Amendment rights,8 they can make political 
contributions,9 and they can be held responsible for crimes in both 
civil and criminal cases.10 But, equating collective entities with 
individuals has been challenged on ethical and philosophical 
grounds.11  
                                                          
4 Id.; Fahrenthold & Kindy, supra note 1. 
5 Fahrenthold & Kindy, supra note 1. 
6 Nielsen, supra note 3. 
7 See 1 U.S.C.A. §1 (West 2010) (specifying that the words “person” and 
“whoever” in all Acts of Congress apply to corporations as well as individuals); 
Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844) 
(holding that a corporation is to be “treated as a citizen of [the State which 
created it], as much as a natural person”). 
8 1 U.S.C. §1; Letson, 43 U.S. 497. 
9 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 07-2240, 2008 WL 
2788753, at *1 (D.D.C. Jul. 18, 2008) (holding that, under the First Amendment, 
the government cannot limit corporate funding of political broadcasts). 
10 1 U.S.C. §1; Letson, 43 U.S. 497. 
11 Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 
207, 207 (1979). See also John Hasnas, Where is Felix Cohen When We Need 
Him?: Transcendental Nonsense and the Moral Responsibility of Corporations, 
19 J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming Fall 2010); Marion Smiley, From Moral Agency 
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This article will explore, from a psychological perspective, the 
issue of equating collective entities with individuals. The 
proceeding discussion will argue that a high level of coherence in 
collective entities, such as corporations, can lead to judgments of 
collective intentionality and responsibility; in such cases, it 
therefore makes legal sense to treat corporations as individuals. 
Part I outlines the traditional differences between perceptions of 
individual and group behavior from a social psychological 
viewpoint. Part II, however, describes how perceptions of groups 
can approximate perceptions of individuals when those groups are 
perceived to be coherent entities.  Parts III, IV, and V explore the 
implications of such perceptions to judgments of corporate 
intentionality and responsibility. Finally, Part VI makes the 
normative point that the degree to which corporations are treated as 
individuals ought to be consistent across situations—regardless of 
whether it results in corporate benefit or detriment.  
Rather than address the philosophical questions of whether it is 
right or wrong, ethical or unethical, to treat these two kinds of 
entities similarly under the law, we will examine, from a social 
psychological point of view, when and why individuals and 
collective entities are perceived in the same ways. Thus, this article 
will address when and why it will appear sensible to the judicial 
and lay population for the two kinds of entities to be treated the 
same under the law. 
This analysis will begin by discussing how perceptions of 
groups and individuals differ as demonstrated by theory and 
research in Social Psychology. Importantly, these differences in 
perception are based on expectations of unity and coherence for the 
attributes and behaviors of individuals,12 but such expectations are 
typically not held for groups.13 Likewise, because individuals are 
perceived as stable and predictable entities, they are held 
responsible for their bad actions—but this is generally not the case 
for groups.14 However, when a group is perceived as high in 
                                                          
to Collective Wrongs: Re-Thinking Collective Moral Responsibility, 19 J.L.  
& POL’Y (forthcoming Fall 2010).  
12 David L. Hamilton & Steven J. Sherman, Perceiving Persons and 
Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 336, 338 (1996). 
13 Id. at 337.  
14 Id. at 340–41. 
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entitativity (that is, as a coherent entity) these tendencies change—
it is viewed as a single collective organism in which all members 
are interchangeable.15 Thus, perceptions of groups take on the 
qualities traditionally associated with the perception of individuals. 
This article will discuss research showing the effects of perceiving 
groups as entities. Most importantly, such perceptions allow for 
judgments of group-level intentionality and collective 
responsibility. In short, this article will identify the conditions 
under which groups such as corporations are perceived as entities, 
and thus when it makes psychological sense to hold a corporation 
responsible for the bad actions of its individual members. 
I. PERCEPTIONS OF GROUPS VERSUS INDIVIDUALS 
This exploration will begin with an analysis of the ways in 
which individuals and groups (i.e., collective entities) are generally 
perceived. A long history of theory and research in psychology 
indicates that groups, such as corporations, are typically perceived 
and treated differently from individuals.16 Such work implies that 
                                                          
15 Matthew T. Crawford, Steven J. Sherman & David L. Hamilton, 
Perceived Entitativity, Stereotype Formation, and the Interchangeability of 
Group Members, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1076, 1089 (2002) 
[hereinafter Crawford et al.]. 
16 Early work by Asch focused on the unified impressions that people form 
of individuals. See Solomon E. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. 
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 258, 258 (1946). Similarly, Anderson proposed 
that social perceivers make integrated summary impressions of individuals and 
he quantified how such impressions would form. See generally NORMAN H. 
ANDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF INFORMATION INTEGRATION THEORY (Academic 
Press 1981). Jones and Davis discussed how social perceivers infer stable 
dispositional aspects in individuals such as traits, motives, and attitudes. See 
Edward E. Jones & Keith E. Davis, From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution 
Process in Person Perception, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 219, 220–22 (L. Berkowitz ed., Academic Press 1965). More 
recently, researchers have discussed how these inferences about individuals are 
made on-line as behavioral information is received and how they are made 
spontaneously. See Reid Hastie & Bernadette Park, The Relationship Between 
Memory and Judgment Depends on Whether the Judgment Task is Memory-
Based or On-Line, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 258, 261, 266 (1986); Meryl Lichtenstein 
& Thomas K. Srull, Processing Objectives as a Determinant of the Relationship 
Between Recall and Judgment, 23 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 93, 112 
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legally treating individuals and groups similarly does not make 
sense psychologically. To analyze this issue more carefully, this 
discussion will first focus on the perception17 of individuals and 
then move on to describe how the perception of groups generally 
differs.  
A key characteristic of the perception of individuals is the 
expectation of unity and internal coherence.18 In other words, 
social perceivers expect individuals to be the same person, in terms 
of an inherent nature or personality, yesterday, today, and 
                                                          
(1987); Donal E. Carlston & John J. Skowronski, Savings in the Relearning of 
Trait Information as Evidence for Spontaneous Inference Generation, 66 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 840, 852–53 (1994); Leonard S. Newman & 
James S. Uleman, Spontaneous Trait Inference, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 155, 
156 (James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989); Laraine Winter & James S. 
Uleman, When are Social Judgments Made? Evidence for the Spontaneousness 
of Trait Inferences, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 249 (1984). With 
regard to impressions of groups, the social psychological literature draws very 
different conclusions: the impressions are generally not unified; see Constantine 
Sedikides & Thomas M. Ostrom, Are Person Categories Used When Organizing 
Information About Unfamiliar Sets of Persons?, 6 SOC. COGNITION, 252, 263 
(1988); Joshua Susskind, et al., Perceiving Individuals and Groups: 
Expectancies, Dispositional Inferences, and Causal Attributions, 76 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 181–82 (1999); they are not made on-line 
but rather are memory-based; see David M. Sanbonmatsu, Steven J. Sherman & 
David L. Hamilton, Illusory Correlation in the Perception of Individuals and 
Groups, 5 SOC. COGNITION 1, 5–7 (1987); and they are not spontaneous; see 
Allen R. McConnell, Steven J. Sherman & David L. Hamilton, On-Line and 
Memory-Based Aspects of Individual and Group Target Judgments, 67 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 173, 182 (1994) [hereinafter McConnell et al., 
Individual and Group Target Judgments]; Robert S. Wyer Jr., Galen V. 
Bodenhausen & Thomas K. Srull, The Cognitive Representation of Persons and 
Groups and its Effect on Recall and Recognition Memory, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 445, 450–51 (1984). Hamilton and Sherman discussed in greater 
detail how and why groups are perceived and treated differently from 
individuals. Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 12, at 339–340. 
17 When this article describes “perception,” it refers generally to the way a 
group or individual is viewed by an observer. In the context of particular 
psychological studies, this is intended to refer to the way study participants view 
the individuals depicted in experiments. However, such “perception” in this 
article is also generalized more broadly to anyone psychologically considering 
an individual or group, be it the general public, juries, or officials in law or 
government. 
18 Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 12, at 337–38. 
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tomorrow. Heider discusses how such expectations lead to fixed 
impressions of individuals as they search for invariance and stable 
properties in the people they perceive.19 He argues that in “person 
perception” (much like object perception) people are motivated to 
find stable characteristics, or “invariance” across conditions, and to 
thereby identify a “disposition.”20 Such a process operates under 
the assumption that a singular and identifiable disposition exists 
and can be inferred from experience.  
Hamilton and Sherman identify the “fundamental postulate” of 
individual impression formation: “The perceiver expects unity and 
coherence in the personalities of others. A person is expected to be 
an organized entity; he or she is the same person, with the same 
personality, yesterday, today, and tomorrow.”21 In their view, 
perceptions of individuals are governed by a drawing together of 
the elements, a drive to form a consistent picture.22 They describe 
four principles at work in this process.  
The first focuses upon the motivations of the perceiver to learn 
the target’s stable disposition.23 
Principle 1 – The perceiver seeks to draw inferences about 
the dispositional properties constituting the core of the 
person’s personality—the fundamental qualities.24  
Although the information obtained about the target by the 
perceiver at any moment may be highly specific, it is collected 
under the motivation to discover underlying patterns of the target’s 
personality characteristics.25 This tendency to move from collected 
information to a coherent picture of a personality often proceeds 
without even the conscious intent to do so.26 A large body of 
                                                          
19 FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 80–81 
(Wiley & Sons 1958). See also Daniel T. Gilbert, Ordinary Personology, in 2 
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 89, 94–97  (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan 
T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., McGraw-Hill 4th ed. 1998). 
20 Gilbert, supra note 19. 
21 Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 12, at 337. 
22 Id. at 338.  
23 Id. at 337.  
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 See, e.g., James S. Uleman, Consciousness and Control: The Case of 
Spontaneous Trait Inferences, 13 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 337, 
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research on spontaneous trait inference has demonstrated that 
merely being presented bits of information about a target person 
quickly leads perceivers to infer stable personality characteristics, 
without deliberate intent to do so on the part of the perceivers.27 
For example, learning that a person has helped an elderly man 
across the street inescapably evokes the inference that this person 
is kind. This tendency to draw dispositional inferences is low-level 
and hard-wired, occurring automatically and below awareness.28 
These inferences are made on-line (i.e., at the time that one gathers 
the information) and are made spontaneously.29 
Hamilton and Sherman’s second principle, regarding 
expectancies, is related to the first: 
Principle 2 – The perceiver expects consistency in the 
target persons’ traits and behaviors. We form strong 
expectancies about [these traits and behaviors].30 
Upon inferring dispositional characteristics, perceivers then 
employ that information to form expectations about future 
behavior, or to evaluate past behavior. In fact, these expectancies 
can be very strong and can wield a great deal of influence over 
judgment.31 Work by Hirt has demonstrated that much 
interpersonal judgment ultimately proceeds from such already-
formed expectations about an actor’s behavior.32 In other words, 
once a person’s “fundamental qualities” are ascertained, those 
qualities guide the expectations for future behavior, because 
individuals are assumed to have reasonably stable and coherent 
                                                          
348 (1987); Winter & Uleman, supra note 16, at 249.   
27 Uleman, supra note 26, at 348; Winter & Uleman, supra note 16, at 248.  
28 Uleman, supra note 26, at 338. 
29 The spontaneous nature of these inferences was nicely demonstrated in a 
series of studies by Carlston and Skowronski. Carlston & Skowronski, supra 
note 16. They reported that subjects learned actors’ traits more quickly if they 
had previously viewed congruent descriptive stimuli. Id. at 852. This savings 
effect occurred regardless of subjects’ processing goals, persisted for a week 
after initial impression formation, and occurred even without conscious 
recognition of the stimuli. Id. at 845, 849, 850. 
30 Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 12, at 338. 
31 Id. (citing Neil Lutsky, Pamela L. Bacon & K.L. Dawson, The More 
Things Stay the Same: Stability in Person Perception (1994) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors)). 
32 Id. 
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personalities.33  
The third and fourth principles are related to one another and 
can be discussed as a set:  
Principle 3 – The perceiver seeks to develop an organized 
impression of the target person. It is a structured picture.34 
Principle 4 – The perceiver strives to resolve 
inconsistencies in the information acquired about the target 
person. 
Both of these principles relate to the human tendency to create 
structured, consistent views of other individuals. Information that 
does not fit an initial impression is not easily accommodated, and 
one must constantly update the impression so that it can accurately 
characterize the ever-increasing set of information and behaviors 
that are learned through interaction.35 Importantly, no matter how 
the impression changes, this impression always reflects a cohesive, 
stable personality. 
These four principles, regarding the human motivation to learn 
dispositional qualities (principle 1), the use of such inferences to 
form expectations (principle 2), the organized impression that 
ultimately results (principle 3), and the drive to resolve 
inconsistencies in such impressions (principle 4), all point to one 
large conclusion: individuals are perceived as cohesive entities, 
and this perception of internal coherence dominates the impression 
formation process. 
Groups, however, are very different.  
For groups, the above postulates and principles do not 
generally hold. Perceivers do not usually expect unity and 
coherence among group members or for group entities.36 Take for 
example, the following statement: 
Jake, a member of the football team, tends to be slow to 
warm up in relationships, but eventually he becomes rather 
clingy.  
Hamilton and Sherman’s principle of individual perception, the 
search for stability and coherence, can be applied to analyze this 
                                                          
33 Id. at 938. 
34 Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 12, at 338. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 340–41. 
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statement.37 To draw a conclusion about an individual, based on 
the available evidence, seems reasonable enough—it is not 
difficult to imagine a fellow named Jake having a particular and 
stable manner of interacting in relationships. As an individual, one 
would expect that he has a particular way of doing things and that 
over time he has accumulated certain experiences that lead such an 
inference to be possible. However, to apply such a statement to the 
group to which he belongs (e.g., “The members of the football 
team tend to be slow to warm up in relationships, but eventually 
become rather clingy”) seems very strange—it would appear 
highly unlikely that the members of a football team or the team as 
a whole would all have the same relationship idiosyncrasies. Even 
in the case of similar behaviors in team members, one might be 
surprised by the coincidence rather than affirmed in the 
expectation of coherence. In other words, people do not generally 
expect the same unity and consistency of a group that would be 
expected of a person. 
In addition, people do not generally make on-line, spontaneous 
trait inferences about groups in the way that they do about 
individuals.38 The impression formation process for groups, rather 
than being done on-line as behavioral information is available, is 
memory-based.39 For example, people may observe the behavior of 
several members of a football team without forming any particular 
impression of what the team as a whole is like. However, when 
someone asks specifically what the team is like, a person will 
search through memory for relevant behavioral information and 
arrive at an impression, based on the particular behaviors that are 
recalled.40 In other words, the process of spontaneous trait 
inference appears to be less common, or nonexistent, at the level of 
                                                          
37 Id. at 337. See also supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
38 McConnell et al., Individual and Group Target Judgments, supra note 
16, at 182. 
39 Allen R. McConnell, Steven J. Sherman & David L. Hamilton, Target 
Entitativity: Implications for Information Processing About Individual and 
Group Targets, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 750, 760–61 (1997) 
[hereinafter McConnell, Target Entitativity]. 
40 Hastie and Park first discussed this important distinction between an on-
line impression formation process and a memory-based impression formation 
process. Hastie & Park, supra note 16, at 261. 
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group perception. This has important implications for differences 
in individual versus group perception. McConnell, Hamilton, and 
Sherman have reported the following differences between the 
impressions of individuals and groups: 41 
1) Better overall recall for behaviors of individuals than 
behaviors of group members 
2) Primacy effects for recall of an individual’s behaviors; 
recency effects for recall of a group’s behaviors 
3) Stronger trait inferences for individuals 
4) Because impression formation of individuals is done on-
line, as behaviors are observed, the impressions of 
individuals will generally reflect their behavior rather 
accurately. For groups, impressions are memory-based. 
Because distinctive behaviors (e.g., infrequent or rare 
behaviors) are most salient in memory, groups are often 
overly associated with traits inferred from these rare 
behaviors. This phenomenon is known as illusory 
correlation, and it generally occurs when the social targets 
are groups but not when they are individuals.42  
Drawing on the findings outlined above, Sherman, Beike, and 
Ryalls investigated differences in the ways in which people 
process information and think about individual versus collective 
entities.43 One of their conclusions is that people experience more 
extreme emotional reactions to individuals than to collectives of 
individuals.44 For example, people feel more sadness and empathy 
for, and they donate more money to save, a single whale stranded 
off the coast than to “save the world’s whale population” (even 
though the single whale is unlikely to survive). They feel very 
                                                          
41 McConnell et al., Individual and Group Target Judgments, supra note 
16, at 181–84. 
42 Id. at 183. 
43 Steven J. Sherman, Denise R. Beike & Kenneth R. Ryalls, Dual-
Processing Accounts of Inconsistencies in Responses to General Versus Specific 
Cases, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 203, 205–206 
(Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., Guilford Press 1999). 
44 In addition to concluding that people react more emotionally to 
individuals than to collectives, Sherman, Beike, and Ryalls suggest that 
attitudes, non-evaluative judgments, and behavioral consequences will also be 
different in the case of individual versus group social targets. Id. at 207–08. 
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badly about an individual girl who is trapped in a well, and they 
donate lots of money to her family (even though they don’t need 
the money).45 The same individuals donate little to diminish 
hunger in the world’s children. Sherman et al. propose that 
different psychological processes are involved in the ways in 
which people process information and make judgments about 
individuals versus collectives.46 Similarly, Small and Loewenstein 
found that people compensate individuated victims far more than 
they compensate victims who are not individuated.47 This is in part 
due to the fact that individuals are more salient and identifiable 
than are collections consisting of less identifiable individuals.48  
Tyler and Mentovich add that it is very difficult to infer the 
intentionality, motivation, or character of collective entities, and it 
is thus much more difficult to justify punishing such an entity from 
either a legal or a psychological point of view.49 Their research, 
which investigated the extent to which evaluations of ethical 
wrongdoing predict punishment for individuals and for corporate 
entities, strongly supported such a conclusion. They found that 
such perceptions of ethical wrongdoing predicted punishment for 
individuals, but not for corporate entities.50 In other words, 
assessing punishment for individuals is contingent upon the 
perception of ethical violation committed, while for corporate 
entities it appears that ethical judgments play a much smaller role 
in such decisions. Likewise, when participants evaluated individual 
New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) officers, motives 
were the primary factor, whereas when participants evaluated the 
                                                          
45 Id. at 204–05. 
46 Id. at 215–17. 
47 Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping 
the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5 (2003). 
We would suggest that analogous results would be observed in the case of 
punishment for perpetrators as opposed to compensation for victims. That is, 
individual criminals should be perceived as more despicable and more deserving 
of harsh punishment than should collective entities. However, we know of no 
empirical work that has addressed this issue. 
48 Id. at 14. 
49 Tom R. Tyler & Avital Mentovich, Punishing Collective Entities, 19 J.L. 
& POL’Y (forthcoming Fall 2010). 
50 Id. 
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NYPD as a whole, the primary factors in such evaluations were 
neutrality and respect. Such findings imply that people generally 
infer motives for individuals but not for corporate entities. For the 
task of assigning punishment and responsibility, people attend to 
motives for individuals, but they attend to other factors for 
corporate entities. 
The evidence presented thus far all implies that the process of 
perceiving and making judgments about individuals is very 
different from that of doing so for groups. A person is a coherent 
unit, expected to possess stable qualities and thus capable of being 
judged and held blameworthy.51 A group, however, is typically not 
seen as a coherent unit, and so generally attributions of group-level 
blame for the acts of individual members should not occur.52 In 
light of this, it makes little psychological sense, and thus perhaps 
little legal sense, to treat individuals and collective entities in the 
same way when it comes to responsibility and punishment. 
However, one very important characteristic can completely alter 
this individual-group difference in perceptions. The following 
discussion shall explore this characteristic and use it to help 
understand when and why it does make both legal and 
psychological sense to treat individuals and collective entities the 
same when it comes to responsibility and punishment. 
II. ENTITATIVE GROUPS: WHEN COLLECTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS ARE 
SEEN AS A UNIT 
The preceding discussion has characterized the process of 
impression formation of individuals, how it proceeds from an 
assumption of stability and coherence, and how it can 
spontaneously and automatically lead to a unified impression of 
individuals, capable of driving expectations and judgment. The 
important ways in which group perception traditionally differs 
from this process (in that groups are generally perceived as 
                                                          
51 Brian Lickel, Toni Schmader & David L. Hamilton, A Case of Collective 
Responsibility: Who Else Was to Blame for the Columbine High School 
Shootings, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 194, 194 (2003) 
[hereinafter Lickel, Schmader & Hamilton, A Case of Collective Responsibility]; 
Tyler & Mentovich, supra note 49. 
52 Id.  
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heterogeneous collections of entities rather than as a single 
collective organism) have also been discussed. A group might have 
members that are socially quiet, for example, but one would 
generally not presume that such must be the case for the other 
group members or the group as a whole based on interactions with 
only a few. Now that the territory has been defined, however, the 
proceeding discussion, which contains the main thrust of the 
message in this paper, will somewhat complicate matters. The key 
point is as follows: The difference between perceptions of 
individuals and groups virtually disappears when a group is high 
in perceived entitativity.  
Entitativity is the perception that a group is a unified and 
coherent whole in which the members are tightly bound together.53 
The notion is similar to the perception of essentialism, or the belief 
that group members share a similar substance or essence.54 A 
collection of individuals standing in line at a supermarket, for 
example, represents a group low in perceived entitativity. A close-
knit immediate family, however, will be high in perceived 
entitativity. All groups can be characterized as having some degree 
of entitativity, on a continuum from very low (heterogeneous, little 
connection between group members) to very high (strong group-
level impression, high cohesiveness among group members).55 
                                                          
53 See Donald T. Campbell, Common Fate, Similarity, and Other Indices of 
the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social Entities, 3 BEHAV. SCI. 14, 17 
(1958); Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 12, at 344–45. 
54 See Nick Haslam et al., Essentialist Beliefs About Social Categories, 39 
BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 113, 114 (2000); Vincent Yzerbyt, Olivier Corneille & 
Claudia Estrada, The Interplay of Subjective Essentialism and Entitativity in the 
Formation of Stereotypes, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 141, 142–43 
(2001) [hereinafter Yzerbyt et al., Essentialism and Entitativity]; Vincent Y. 
Yzerbyt, Anouk Rogier & Susan T. Fiske, Group Entitativity and Social 
Attribution: On Translating Situational Constraints into Stereotypes, 24 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1089, 1092 (1998) [hereinafter Yzerbyt 
et al., Group Entitativity and Social Attribution]. 
55 Lickel et al. obtained ratings of the entitativity of forty groups that 
differed in a variety of ways. Subjects were asked the extent to which they 
would consider each to be a real group. The ratings varied from very low in the 
case of people in line at a bank to very high for members of a family and 
members of a professional sports team. Brian Lickel et al., Varieties of Groups 
and the Perception of Group Entitativity, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
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Lickel and colleagues have developed a taxonomy of group 
types as a function of this characteristic.56 Using clustering and 
multidimensional scaling analyses of participant entitativity ratings 
for a wide variety of groups, results indicated the existence of four 
distinct group types: intimacy groups, task groups, social 
categories, and loose associations.57 Intimacy groups, representing 
the highest level of entitativity, include individuals who are 
romantically involved or members of the same close-knit family or 
group of friends.58 Such associations are personally important and 
play a central role in daily life. Task groups, in which individuals 
come together to reach collective goals, appear next on the 
continuum.59 A corporation is a prototypic example of a task 
group; membership in such groups involves cooperation and 
subordination of individual goals to those of the group. 
Immediately beneath task groups are social categories, which are 
defined by common features such as nationality, gender, or 
ethnicity. At the lowest point of the entitativity continuum are 
loose associations, in which individuals are associated by 
happenstance, such as when people share a similar interest in 
classical music or happen to be in the same place at the same time 
(e.g., people in a particular movie theater).60 
Importantly, this research also demonstrated that perceptions of 
group entitativity were determined by the degree to which the 
groups exhibited certain features: interaction (amount of personal 
                                                          
223, 227 (2000) [hereinafter Lickel et al., Perception of Group Entitativity]. 
56 Id. at 227–31. 
57 Id. at 229; Sherman, Castelli, and Hamilton demonstrated that this group 
typology was used spontaneously in encoding information about various social 
groups. Subjects saw faces with labels indicating group membership. Then they 
had to recall the group memberships when shown only the faces. There were far 
more within-group-type errors than between-group-type errors.  For example, 
subjects were more likely to recall a Presbyterian as a Frenchman (both social 
categories) than as a jury member (a task group). Steven J. Sherman, Luigi 
Castelli & David L. Hamilton, The Spontaneous Use of a Group Typology as an 
Organizing Principle in Memory, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 328, 331 
(2002). 
58 Lickel et al., Perception of Group Entitativity, supra note 55, at 229. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 230. 
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contact between group members);61 common goals (shared 
aspirations between group members);62 common outcomes 
(collective experiences of success or failure);63 group-member 
similarity (shared qualities between group members);64 and 
importance of the group (centrality or prominence of group 
membership in daily life).65 Additionally, group size (number of 
members); group duration (length of time the group exists); and 
permeability (ease of joining and leaving the group) were cited as 
other factors in perceptions of group entitativity, though they were 
found to only weakly predict such judgments.66 On the whole, the 
more that group members spend time together, want the same 
things, share a similar fate, exhibit similar characteristics, and 
consider the group to be an important part of life, the more 
entitative that group is perceived to be. 
When a group is perceived as entitative it is conceived to be a 
coherent entity, that is, an abstracted impression of the group is 
formed in a similar manner to the formation of impressions of 
individuals.67 Similar to cognitions about individuals, when groups 
are entitative, judgments take place on-line, as behavioral 
information is received.68 When group characteristics lead to 
expectations of entitativity, group impressions are formed in an 
integrative fashion such that information is abstracted to form a 
single, coherent representation.69 As a result, later judgments about 
these groups derive from this general impression that is formed at 
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67 McConnell et al., Individual and Group Target Judgments, supra note 
16, at 182. 
68 Id. See also Hastie & Park, supra note 16, at 261.  
69 McConnell et al., Individual and Group Target Judgments, supra note 
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the time of encoding.70  
When little entitativity is expected, information about different 
group members is stored in a diffuse manner. In such cases, 
judgments made about groups are constructed at the time such 
judgments are required, necessitating an evaluation of the 
individuated information stored in memory.71 Conversely, research 
on cognitive representation has shown that entitative groups are 
stored as a group prototype (that is, a mental conception of the 
group in terms of a singular prototypical group member) rather 
than as a multiplicity of individuals.72   
As an illustration of these findings, one might conceive of the 
mental representation of a non-entitative group to be somewhat 
like a group photograph, in which the set of individuals maintain 
their individual characteristics and are depicted independently. 
When the need to make a judgment about such a group arises (e.g., 
how attractive are members of this group?), one must recall the full 
picture of all group members, evaluate this information, and then 
integrate it to draw a conclusion. On the other hand, when making 
judgments about an entitative group, the integrative work has 
already been done—one needs only to evaluate this group 
prototype to reach a conclusion. For such highly entitative groups, 
people not only extract traits but also develop a “group 
character.”73 While such would not be the case for a random set of 
individuals waiting at a traffic light, one might characterize a 
highly entitative group as “snobby” or “artistic” or “concerned 
about the environment.” The more a group is perceived to be a 
cohesive unit, the more likely inferences about the group and its 
members become.74 
In sum, when a group is perceived as entitative, all the 
principles that apply to impression formation for individuals apply 
to the group as well. Impressions of entitative groups are 
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72 Marilynn B. Brewer & Amy S. Harasty, Seeing Groups As Entities: The 
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characterized by strong and spontaneous trait inferences, enhanced 
memory for behaviors of group members, primacy effects in the 
memory of these behaviors, on-line processing of information 
about the group and its members, and the absence of the usual 
illusory correlation that occurs for groups of low entitativity.75 
One aspect of impressions for entitative groups is extremely 
important for understanding issues of collective blame and 
responsibility. This aspect involves the interchangeability of group 
members when the group is perceived as highly entitative. One 
study in particular demonstrated how entitative group members 
come to be perceived as interchangeable. This study by Crawford, 
Sherman, and Hamilton investigated the effects of the perceived 
entitativity of a group on the processing of information about 
individual group members and the extent to which such 
information is transferred to other group members.76 Their findings 
expanded upon a well-known finding in the literature, the savings-
in-relearning effect.77   
The savings-in-relearning effect was demonstrated through the 
following study method: Pictures of (unrelated) individuals were 
shown to participants. Each picture was accompanied by a 
behavioral description of something that the person did (e.g., 
describing a picture of Tom: “I have this certain knack for 
mathematical problems. I can usually calculate relatively complex 
problems in my head faster than most people can do them with a 
calculator. It’s just something I do well.”). Each description clearly 
implied a trait—intelligent in the above example. Other implied 
traits were aggressive, lazy, etc. After participants saw the pictures 
and the accompanying behavioral descriptions, they had to learn to 
associate each previously seen picture with a single trait.78 Thus, 
the picture of Tom might be paired with the trait “lazy” or 
“intelligent.” Participants were better at learning these associations 
when the pictures were paired with the trait that had been implied 
by the previously seen behavioral description (e.g., learning to pair 
                                                          
75 Id. at 181–84. 
76 Crawford et al., supra note 15, at 1076. 
77 Carlston & Skowronski, supra note 16, at 842; John J. Skowronski et al., 
Spontaneous Trait Transference: Communicators Take on the Qualities They 
Describe in Others, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 837, 842 (1998).  
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the trait “intelligent” with the photograph after that photograph had 
been paired with a behavioral description implying intelligence). 
Thus, participants learned to associate Tom with intelligent more 
quickly than with lazy or aggressive. These results showed that 
people spontaneously extract trait inferences from observed 
behaviors in the case of individuals.79  
Crawford, Sherman, and Hamilton expanded upon these 
findings to investigate whether the effect emerged in the case of 
groups of individuals.80 To do this, as the pictures of individuals 
were shown, they were designated as belonging to either Group A 
or Group B.81 All the different members of a group engaged in 
behaviors that indicated one or the other of two traits (e.g., honest 
or aggressive; lazy or intelligent). The perceived entitativity of the 
groups was manipulated. For low entitative groups, participants 
were told that the individuals in the group were in the same 
introductory psychology course, that they saw each other only in 
the classroom, and that they did not interact outside the 
classroom.82 High entitative groups were described as close friends 
for many years, who spent a great deal of time together and were 
very much connected to each other.83 Pictures of members of two 
groups (both either high or low in entitativity) were shown along 
with the behavioral descriptions that indicated some trait. After 
this, participants engaged in the trait-learning task, in which they 
had to learn to associate each picture with a specific trait.84 
Sometimes the trait was the one implied by the behavior of that 
specific person. Sometimes the trait was the one implied by the 
behaviors of other members of that person’s group, but not by the 
person’s own behavior. Sometimes the trait was implied by the 
behaviors of members of the other group.   
For low entitative groups, the results were exactly the same as 
they had been for individuals—savings-in-relearning when an 
                                                          
79 Id. at 852. See also Jamie DeCoster & Eliot R. Smith, Savings in 
Relearning Through Exposure to Same-Group Exemplars, 5 CURRENT RES. IN 
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individual was paired with the trait that was implied by his own 
behavior.85 There were no savings when learning to pair a person 
with the trait implied by the behaviors of other members of the low 
entitative group.86 Members of low entitative groups were thus 
treated as a collection of unconnected individuals.   
The results for high entitative groups were strikingly different. 
In this case, there was savings-in-relearning whether the trait was 
implied by the behavior of the specific group member or the 
behavior of some other group member.87 Thus, if Tom was a 
member of a high entitative group and behaved in an intelligent 
way, there was savings-in-learning for learning Tom–intelligent. 
There was equal savings-in-learning for learning Tom–lazy if other 
members of Tom’s highly entitative group had done lazy things. In 
fact, there were no differences in the degree of savings, suggesting 
that all members of a highly entitative group are treated as 
interchangeable parts.88 In other words, if some members of the 
group have a particular trait, it is assumed that all members have 
the trait, and the trait spontaneously spreads to all other members 
of the group. Once the perception of interchangeability is made, 
one cannot recall exactly which member engaged in which kind of 
behavior.89 All members of an entitative group are treated in a 
unitary way and are assumed to share the same attributes. 
Does it make sense to hold collective entities such as 
corporations responsible for the acts of individual members? The 
answer is “yes” from a psychological point of view—but only if 
the group is perceived as entitative. If members are indeed 
perceived as interchangeable parts, the bad acts of any members 
will be seen as applying to all members. Thus, it is the group as a 
whole that is seen as blameworthy rather than (or at least in 
addition to) the specific individuals who behaved badly. This 
important issue of collective responsibility will be addressed 
further in a subsequent section. 
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III. ENTITATIVITY AND PERCEPTIONS OF GROUP-LEVEL 
INTENTIONALITY 
Entitativity has important implications for the attribution of 
responsibility to groups. Group-level inferences of intentionality 
are a precondition to any perception of group level blame, and only 
an entitative group will be perceived as having group-level 
intentions, particularly intentions that relate to the nature and 
characteristics of the group. Tyler and Mentovich claim that the 
reason that responsibility is not easily attributed to groups is that it 
is difficult to infer intentionality on the part of the group.90 The 
preceding discussion in this paper would suggest that this is true 
only as long as the groups are non-entitative ones. For high 
entitative groups, however, the inference of group-level 
intentionality, and thus causality, ought to be similar to such 
inferences for an individual actor. As a result, groups that are 
highly entitative can be seen as having intentions, and such 
intentionality makes it possible to attribute blame to them and to 
punish them. Such blame and punishment to these groups will 
seem psychologically sensible and sustainable. 
There has been some research that offers good empirical 
evidence that inferences about group-level motivations, intentions, 
and causality are made in the case of high entitative but not low 
entitative collections of individuals. Dasgupta, Banaji, and Abelson 
employed “greebles” (objects made to look like creatures with 
particular characteristics) to investigate the effects of perceived 
entitativity on group-level judgments.91 Their research 
demonstrated that groups that are seen as entitative (e.g., groups of 
greebles in which the members are similar in appearance and 
physically close to each other) are assumed to share more 
psychological (personality) similarities among members.92 More 
relevant to intentionality, Abelson et al. also demonstrated that 
these entitative groups were considered to be more capable of 
                                                          
90 Tyler & Mentovich, supra note 49. 
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retaliation.93 In other words, such groups were more likely to be 
seen as possessing negative motivations and intentions as well as 
the capability to successfully act on such intentions.94 Other work 
by Abelson, Park, and Banaji demonstrated that, after being primed 
with group words like “they” (leading to more entitative group 
perceptions), negative behaviors by a group were evaluated more 
negatively than the same negative behaviors attributed to an 
individual.95 However, after being primed with individualized 
words like “he” (leading to less entitative group perceptions), the 
pattern reversed: negative behaviors by a group were evaluated 
less negatively than the same negative behaviors attributed to the 
individual.96   
Another way in which group entitativity and thus perceptions 
of group-level intentionality can be increased is by de-
individuating the members of the group. The less the individual 
group members can be identified or be seen as unique individuals 
with different qualities, the more the group will be perceived in a 
unitary way and be perceived as having a higher level of 
entitativity.97 One way to de-individuate the members is to have 
them physically hide their identities.98 Research on the de-
individuation process in fact shows that, when group members 
have their faces hidden by masks, individual members are held less 
responsible for negative outcomes and acts.99 For example, it may 
be that by having members wear hoods, the Ku Klux Klan can 
reduce the individuality of the members. If so, this increased 
perceived entitativity of the Klan may make it easier to attribute 
evil intentions to the group as a whole and to justify punishing the 
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group and all of its members. In this way, uniforms, badges, 
slogans, and symbols may lead to de-individuation, increased 
perceived entitativity, and group-level intentionality. 
In other words, to the extent that a group is perceived as 
entitative, it can be seen as possessing intentionality—specifically, 
the intention to engage in negative action. Moreover, an entitative 
group is presumed to be likely to engage in such behaviors—that 
is, the members are conceived to be more able to carry out the 
malevolent intentions of the group.100 As Tyler and Mentovich 
rightly argue, perceptions of collective intentionality are integral to 
whether a group is seen as culpable for its actions—that is, for 
judgments of group-level responsibility.101  
IV. ENTITATIVITY AND PERCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY 
The next important step in the present line of argument is to 
directly link perceived group entitativity to collective 
responsibility. The greater attribution of collective blame to 
entitative groups compared to non-entitative groups has been 
directly demonstrated in research that Lickel, Schmader, and 
Hamilton have conducted on perceptions of collective 
responsibility for the Columbine killings, in which two high school 
shooters killed twelve of their classmates.102 Collective 
responsibility, as treated in this work, refers to “the perception that 
others, besides the wrongdoers themselves, are responsible for the 
event.”103 
Lickel, Schmader, and Hamilton assessed such judgments by 
collecting data on the study participants’ beliefs about the role of 
the Trenchcoat Mafia (to which both of the shooters belonged) in 
the killings as well as the role of the shooters’ parents, posing 
questions about the perceived entitativity and collective 
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responsibility of each group.104 They also posed questions 
assessing the magnitude of errors of commission and omission 
perceived in the group’s actions that made the group share in the 
responsibility. Errors of commission refer to actual actions of 
group members, other than the two shooters, that led the shooters 
to decide to engage in the assault. Errors of omission refer to 
things that group members, other than the shooters, might have 
done (but didn’t) and should have done that would have prevented 
them from their killings.105 Importantly, collective responsibility 
was determined differently for each of the two groups. For the 
Trenchcoat Mafia, acts of commission (contributing to the acts of 
the shooters) were key, such that ratings of contribution to the acts 
statistically predicted judgments of group-level responsibility for 
the outcome. However, for the parents, acts of omission (failure to 
prevent the shooters’ acts) were key, such that ratings of failures to 
prevent the outcome predicted responsibility attributed to the 
family.106 Additionally, and more importantly, the degree of 
perceived entitativity of the Trenchcoat Mafia group was found to 
be correlated with attributions of responsibility to that group for 
the tragedy itself.107 In other words, the more the young men in 
trench coats were perceived to be a cohesive unit, the more they as 
a group bore the blame for the outcome.  
The research of Denson et al. demonstrated a similar pattern.108 
They had participants evaluate various kinds of groups (intimacy 
groups, task groups, social categories, loose associations) as to 
how much the group should be blamed for the actions of individual 
members, and measured perceptions of entitativity and 
essentialism for the various groups.109 They showed that groups 
were rated differently for entitativity,110 and that these ratings of 
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entitativity were found to be positively correlated with ratings of 
collective responsibility.111 That is, the more entitative a group was 
seen to be, the more participants considered that the group should 
be held responsible for the actions of the individual members. 
Again, task groups such as corporations are perceived as high in 
entitativity and thus are, from a psychological perspective, likely to 
bear collective responsibility. 
As one might expect, given that perceptions of entitativity 
enhance collective blame for wrongdoing, research has 
demonstrated that entitative groups engender more dispositional, 
rather than situational, attributions for negative actions.112 Yzerbyt 
et al. presented groups as aggregates of individuals or as cohesive 
entities, and then had participants evaluate the behavior of group 
members with regard to dispositional (internal) or situational 
(external) causation.113 The behavior of entitative group members 
was attributed to their dispositional characteristics, whereas the 
behavior of non-entitative groups was attributed to situational 
factors.114 Such findings have important implications for blame. 
Specifically, when a group is low in entitativity, people use 
situational explanations to excuse wrong behaviors. On the other 
hand, when a group is high in entitativity, people explain actions 
based on dispositional characteristics. Intentionality and blame 
attribution are usually associated with such dispositional (rather 
than situational) explanations.  
There is also evidence that perceived entitativity is related not 
only to collective blame but to retributive intergroup aggression.115 
Specifically, the more entitative a group is perceived to be, the 
more likely group members will be to receive retribution for acts 
committed by other group members.116 That is, once again, to the 
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extent that a group is entitative, individuals are more likely to be 
held responsible, and thus punished, for the actions of their fellow 
members. 
How do group members feel about the bad behaviors of other 
group members? Do they feel shame and guilt, and thus feel that 
they deserve some of the blame and responsibility for those bad 
behaviors? Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, and Ames 
demonstrated that individuals feel the most guilt for a fellow group 
member’s actions when they perceive themselves to be highly 
interdependent with the group of shared membership.117 
Individuals felt the most shame when the particular negative 
behavior of the group member was seen as relevant to their 
common identity.118 Together, these results suggest that shame and 
guilt for the wrongdoing of one’s group (particularly when it is a 
wrongdoing that is relevant to the group’s identity itself) are 
related to the extent to which the group is entitative. Thus, 
members of entitative groups should be more willing to accept 
responsibility, blame, and punishment for the actions of other 
members.  
The degree of entitativity of a group is also related to the 
relational style of the group,119 that is, the rules of interaction by 
which group members relate to each other and interact with each 
other.120 As has been described earlier in this article, entitativity is 
also related to perceptions of collective responsibility,121 and 
therefore understanding the ways in which entitativity, relational 
style, and collective responsibility interact is important for 
understanding when and why it makes psychological sense to 
blame and punish the group as a whole for the transgressions of 
individual members of the group. 
Fiske has identified four basic types of relational style—the 
social rules and principles used to regulate the social interactions 
and relationships within a group and to characterize the way in 
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which resources are shared.122 “Market pricing” is characterized by 
a calculation of the utility of interaction—efficiency and 
maximization of resources are the key motivations, and there is a 
capitalistic search for individual gains.123 In an “equality 
matching” style, the goal is to maintain balance among the group 
members, and reciprocity and turn taking characterize the 
interactions.124 “Communal sharing” involves the fusion of the self 
to the group; generosity is the key motive in exchange, resources 
are shared, and decisions are made unanimously.125 Finally, 
“authority ranking” involves interactions that are guided by status 
differences among members, where decisions are made by a 
leader, and orders follow a clear chain of command.126 
Lickel, Rutchick, Hamilton, and Sherman assessed the relation 
between perceived entitativity and relational style for the four 
basic group types (intimacy, task, social categories, and loose 
associations).127 Most important for the purposes of this paper are 
the findings regarding task groups, the group type of corporations. 
They reported that task groups were characterized by interactions 
that were regulated by high levels of market pricing and to some 
extent authority ranking.128 In an earlier study, Lickel, Hamilton, 
and Sherman outlined those aspects of perceived entitativity that 
were most related to collective responsibility.129 Particularly 
important in the association of high levels of perceived entitativity 
and collective responsibility was the extent to which group 
members are interpersonally interdependent on each other.130  
These factors very well characterize the social relational style 
that exists within many corporations. For corporations that are 
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highly competitive with other corporations and where pressures 
exist to succeed and realize a profit, cooperation among group 
members is key. The members must work together as a unit, share 
goals, and have a great deal of commitment to the group. These are 
all necessitated by the strong market pricing relational style of 
these corporations. Thus, for corporations that are highly 
competitive and have a strong market pricing style, one would 
predict high levels of perceived entitativity and a high degree of 
collective responsibility for any wrongdoing. Thus, again, it 
appears to make psychological sense to hold such corporations 
collectively responsible for the crimes of individual members. 
As to the degree of legal responsibility attributed to individual 
members of groups, perceived entitativity may ultimately have 
varying kinds of effects. As has been described, high perceived 
entitativity will lead groups as a whole to be viewed as more 
responsible for the actions of their members, and thus at a group 
level they will be punished more. As a result, individual group 
members not directly responsible for the wrongdoing will likely 
experience greater retribution than they would in a less entitative 
group, as they come to bear the misdeeds of their fellow group 
members. However, as to the case of any individual group member 
who commits wrongdoing, high perceived entitativity of the group 
may dilute, and thereby mitigate, responsibility and punishment to 
that individual as some of the blame is shifted to the group as a 
whole.  
With regard to people in positions of power, we speculate a 
number of possibilities. In some cases, it may be that people in 
positions of authority will be blamed more under conditions of 
high entitativity, because they will take responsibility for the acts 
of those below them in the chain of command. For example, this 
may be most true in task groups, where there is role 
differentiation.131 However, in some circumstances the 
responsibility for the behavior of individuals may not be 
generalized to the group (e.g., the military, or the government, as a 
whole).132 Importantly, one of the main methods to keep this 
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responsibility from moving upstream is to argue against the level 
of connection of the offenders to the rest of the group.133 The “few 
bad apples” are argued not to be part of the group.134 They are 
others. And, as such, the rest of the group members claim that the 
behavior of the bad apples should not be considered the collective 
behavior, or the collective responsibility, of the larger group. This 
method of shielding other group members and the group as a 
whole from responsibility and punishment is called the black sheep 
effect.135 It may be that even an entitative group can protect its 
members by casting out, as black sheep, those who have 
transgressed. In this way, the group can maintain its high level of 
entitativity while avoiding the responsibility and punishment that 
usually spreads through the membership of such groups. Thus, the 
effects of entitativity upon responsibility for any particular group 
member or the group as a whole are complex and depend on the 
particular role of that individual in the group action, as well as the 
response of the group to that member’s behavior. 
V. CORPORATIONS AS ENTITIES 
The discussion will now move to addressing the question of 
how corporations become entities in the minds of perceivers. 
Lay, or folk theories are beliefs that develop within a culture in 
order to make sense of human experience, and they have particular 
relevance for inferences of group-level intentionality and 
responsibility.136 An important component of the process by which 
groups come to be viewed as coherent entities are the intuitive 
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beliefs people have about the nature of groups themselves.137 That 
is, people have beliefs about what particular types of groups are 
“like,” and such preconceptions influence how people make 
judgments about the groups they encounter.138 
Among these beliefs are perceptions of essentialism of 
particular types of groups.139 Entitative groups (in this case, 
generally groups in which the members share characteristics) are 
seen as sharing a similar essence, or underlying quality.140 Such 
essentialist lay theories about entitative groups are part of what 
leads group members to be treated as interchangeable,141 and to be 
judged as responsible for wrong acts.142  
In addition to the sense of a group essence, humans are also 
inclined toward anthropomorphism, the attribution of human 
characteristics to non-humans. For example, humans attribute 
human characteristics to pets,143 machines,144 spiritual beings,145 
and even moving shapes.146 For the same reason, in the case of 
entitative groups, people are inclined to infer human characteristics 
for the group, such as intentions, motivations, and even 
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consciousness.147 Such inferences are part of what makes it 
possible to conceive of responsibility at the group level. 
Lay theories are an important step by which individual 
cognition comes to be reflected in legal doctrine. It has been 
argued elsewhere that metaphoric lay theories of emotion have 
played an important role in the development of the legal doctrine 
of voluntary manslaughter.148 Specifically, linguistic metaphors for 
anger (“boiling,” “burning,” “exploding’) and fear (“freezing,” 
“chilled”) can be linked to lay theories of the operation of anger 
and fear. The lay theory for anger, as it involves exploding and 
heat, is consistent with violent aggression. The lay theory for fear, 
as it involves freezing and stillness, is not consistent with a “heat 
of passion” murder. It is no wonder, then, that killings out of anger 
often benefit from the voluntary manslaughter doctrine whereas 
killings out of fear (e.g., battered wives) do not.149  
Although lay theories play a role in the process by which 
groups come to be perceived as entities, this phenomenon may also 
be explained by the particular characteristics of the group itself. 
Specifically, corporations may be likely to be perceived as entities 
and receive blame because of their inherent characteristics. The 
following discussion will delineate this concept.  
First, as task groups, corporations occupy the second most 
entitative group type.150 These task groups involve a great deal of 
interdependence as the group approaches its work.151 As the 
employees of a corporation work together to advance their 
interests, they come to form a group that is relatively high in 
entitativity. 
Second, corporations bear many of the other specific attributes 
associated with entitative groups.152 Corporations involve a great 
deal of mutual interaction (usually in the physically shared work 
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environment, though also through technologically-mediated 
communication). They also experience common outcomes 
(benefits and losses shared by employees as a function of the gains 
and losses of the company). Additionally, employees of 
corporations share various similarities, from their common 
experience with the same corporate culture, to their shared 
affiliation with the particular company brand identity, and to their 
shared logos and symbols. Finally, the corporate context is one of 
great group importance, as the group represents the members’ very 
livelihood. 
Third, collective goal pursuit, a characteristic clearly associated 
with corporations (i.e., the advancement of the company’s 
interests), is central to perceptions of entitativity.153 Welbourne has 
demonstrated that sharing a common purpose is among the 
strongest determiners of group entitativity perception.154 Similarly, 
Hong, Levi, and Chiu have demonstrated that entitativity is partly 
determined by structural characteristics of the group, which 
include common goals.155 Ip, Chiu, and Wan demonstrated that 
such collective action is particularly important in determining 
perceptions of group entitativity.156  
Fourth, the usual relational style for members of corporations 
involves high levels of interaction and communication, behavioral 
influence among members, strong identification with the group, 
common goals and outcomes, strong interpersonal bonds, and 
market pricing principles. These are exactly the relational style 
aspects that are associated with a high level of perceived 
entitativity. 
Fifth, and perhaps most strikingly, groups that compete are 
seen as more entitative.157 Certainly competition is one of the 
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hallmarks of corporate existence, and a central aspect of 
participation in corporate enterprise is engaging in competition 
with other corporate entities.  
For these reasons (and surely others exist), corporations are 
likely to be perceived as entitative, and as such, they are likely to 
be attributed collective responsibility for wrongdoing. Despite the 
fact that corporations constitute groups of people rather than 
individuals, the entitativity of such groups leads them to be viewed 
much like cohesive individuals—individuals who can be held 
responsible for their crimes. 
VI. BITTER WITH THE SWEET: CONSISTENCY IN LEGAL PERCEPTIONS 
OF CORPORATION ENTITATIVITY  
Lay theories and phenomenological psychology can be very 
important in the development of legal doctrine and legal 
principles.158 Lay theories about causality, intentionality, 
premeditation, and foreseeability have been important for legal 
principles involving whether or not a crime has been committed, 
what kind of crime has been committed, how much responsibility 
one has for that crime, and how much punishment should be 
associated with the crime.159 As outlined earlier, lay theories about 
the operation of the emotions of anger and fear may well have been 
involved in the development, maintenance, and application of the 
voluntary manslaughter doctrine. This paper has focused on the 
ways in which lay theories about group entitativity can lead to 
judgments of collective intentionality and responsibility, and thus 
how it makes legal sense to treat corporations as individuals. 
Indeed, the development of these legal principles can no doubt be 
traced in part to the operation of these lay theories. 
The question remains whether corporate entities should be 
imbued with such human qualities and expectations? Should they 
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bear the responsibility and penalties for the acts of individuals?  
Rather than directly addressing the normative question of 
whether corporations should be held responsible for their actions 
as coherent entities, we have, as psychologists, dealt with the 
reasons why such perceptions might occur and what one should 
expect from such perceptions given the existing research. 
However, there is a normative point to be made. 
From a psychological point of view, it is understandable that 
corporations came to be viewed as entities, and thus that it feels 
natural to hold them responsible for the wrongdoing of individual 
members. While this article does not take a position on whether or 
not this should be true per se, we do believe strongly in the 
normative argument for consistency in such conceptions of the 
corporation. Specifically, if corporations are to be treated as 
individuals regarding, for example, free speech rights,160 then they 
must be treated as individuals regarding corporate wrongdoing. 
That is, if corporations are to benefit from perceptions of 
entitativity, they must also accept the downside of being perceived 
as entitative—collective responsibility. If corporations are to be 
allotted the rights of individuals (e.g., free speech), they must be 
allotted the responsibilities of individuals (that is, the ability to be 
held responsible as a cohesive entity) as well. Likewise, if such 
rights are refused, then they ought not be held responsible as 
entities. 
This viewpoint stands in tension with the two sides generally 
represented in the debate over corporate legal issues—one that 
stands for the defense of corporate entities and advocates for 
corporate rights and yet also wants corporate protection from 
responsibility; and the other that stands for significant corporate 
responsibility for wrongdoing, yet advocates against corporate 
rights and against corporate power. Both such camps are 
inconsistent in their agendas. Either corporations should be 
conceptualized as entities, with the rights and responsibilities of 
individuals, or they should be conceptualized as nonentities, and be 
imbued with neither.  
Importantly, such an issue hinges on the degree to which the 
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corporation is conceived of as an entity. As has been shown here, 
such perceptions of entitativity are central to any question of 
corporate responsibility. Despite the fact that corporations are 
certainly distinct from individual humans (that is, that they are not 
entities in the organismic sense), conceptualizing groups as 
coherent entities is a natural and psychologically understandable 
response to certain kinds of groups. However, the extent to which a 
corporation is legally conceived to be an entity should be 
consistent across both the costs and benefits of entitative existence.  
With that in mind, this discussion will return to the two events 
described at the beginning of this paper: both the tragic stories of 
the Upper Big Branch coal mine disaster161 and the death of baby 
Brianna.162 For the purposes of this article, the central question is 
whether Massey Energy ought to be evaluated for their role in the 
mining disaster in the same manner as Brianna’s neglectful 
babysitter. Can Massey Energy be seen as a figure in the line of 
causal events, possessing intention, committing wrongdoing, 
moving through space as a coherent entity? Can such an 
organization, like an individual entrusted with the care of an infant, 
fail to protect those who depend on it and in so doing endanger 
lives? Drawing from the theoretical and empirical work regarding 
the consequences and correlates of perceived entitativity, we 
believe that the answer is yes. 
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